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THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS
As a preface to a discussion of any of the tentative drafts of the
restatement of law it is interesting to recall the situation which created
the need for the American Law Institute, and the objects which its
founders hoped to attain. Logic is a method of classification, and the
logical machinery of the law is a classification of the opinions of ap-
pellate courts under titles or concepts. As rapidly as the increasingly
numerous opinions appear, they are put under the protection of one of
these abstractions, and, once there, automatically become part of the
field of "law" for which the abstraction stands as a symbol. The
more ingeniously the legal analogies and concepts are used, the more
dissimilar become the cases grouped under any one classification,
until at times these terms become almost meaningless. Yet prior to
the American Law Institute no systematic reclassification had ever been
attempted. The magnitude of the task was terrifying. The con-
servative acceptance of the old terms, drilled into students by law
school courses, emphasized in text books and digests, had become part
of the very fibre of conventional "law in books" as distinguished from
"law in action."
"Law in books" takes various forms. Sometimes iL consists of
definite directions, called rules; sometimes inspirational sermons called
principles; sometimes vague analogies called standards. If such princi-
ples, rules, and standards are applied to similar problems, they are gen-
erally understandable. But if such abstractions are applied to an as-
sorted group of dissimilar situations, involving different problems, they
begin to cut across the cases in zigzag lines which are impossible either
to follow or predict, without endless refinement, reclassification, and
qualifying abstractions. Thus our method of expression becomes more
and more complicated. The number of irrelevant cases which appear
to be governed by the same principles because of the common use of
an ancient term becomes unlimited. New abstractions become neces-
sary in order to be able to talk at all, and courts are constantly creat-
ing them.
Some of these new abstractions are useful and convenient; some
of the old terms are made clear by skillful refinement. But others
are useless, and these useless ones become an impediment to intelligible
judicial speech, and a trap for the unwary judge or lawyer. Yet the
natural conservatism of the judicial mind seems to prevent courts
from destroying useless concepts. They do not know how much
law they might be repealing if they say, for example, "The Statute of
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Uses has no modem significance in the law of trusts." The idea ex-
pressed in the phrase "Where he (Justice Marshall) did not dare to go,
others may well hesitate to venture,"' reappears again and again. Only
the legislature can rescue the courts from the confusing classification
of unlike cases under an unhappy phrase, and the legislature hesitates
because they cannot understand what the problem is or why they should
be called upon to extricate courts from self-created difficulties.
The situation is described by Elihu Root in a speech made at the
time the American Law Institute was organized, when he said:
"It was apparent that the confusion, the uncertainty was growing worse
from year to year. It was apparent that the vast multitude of decisions which
our practitioners were obliged to consult was reaching a magnitude which made
it impossible in ordinary practice to consult them."'
Into this situation the American Law Institute, with its corps of
learned men and its supporting artillery of great names, was intro-
duced to clear away the debris. Social and economic results of the law
were only incidental to its investigation; legal philosophy was to be
only a by-product. The important task was to relieve attorneys from
the burden of examining and distinguishing the thousands of irrelevant
cases which, bound together by the clasp of ancient concepts, could
be thrown at the court. It becomes material therefore in discussing
any new draft of the restatement of laws to inquire whether that task
has been forgotten.
That inquiry leads us to ask whether the treatment of those cases
where courts have seen fit to use the term trusts is not a departure
from the real purpose of the Institute. Some of these cases would
go well in a restatement of the law of future interests, others in a
restatement of the law of the administration of insolvent estates, others
in a restatement of equitable remedies for fraud.3
'Potomac Mills & Ice Co. v. B. & 0. R. Co., 217 Fed. 665 (D. Md. 1914), per
Rose, J.
'American Law Institute Is Organized (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 137.
Professor Richard Powell has combined most of the cases using the trust
device with cases on wills and future interests in a course called "Trusts and
Estates." In doing so he gains the great advantage of being able to discuss the
problem which confronts the man of property in disposing of his estate unhindered
by the need to reconcile other uses of the term. In his introduction to "Materials
for Course in Future Interests and Non-Commercial Trusts" (1929) he says:
"When the hypotheses of a curriculum reorganization along functional lines were
first applied to the field of property law, some facts seemed evident forthwith. It
became apparent (1) that when a human being accumulates wealth, one of his most
absorbing activities centers about the dispositions of that wealth; (2) that such dis-
positions occasionally take the form of living trusts, but more frequently are em-
bodied in wills; (3) that the recent increased use of insurance trusts has made
this aspect of law of importance to a group many times larger than were heretofore
interested therein; (4) that such dispositions normally involve both trusts and
future interests; (5) that this body of law deals with a large area of characteristic
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We presume that the answer of those responsible for the Insti-
tute's program would be that courts, lawyers, text book writers, and di-
gesters are accustomed to treating of a thing they call the law of trusts.
Since the restatement is for their use, it must follow the classifications
to which they are accustomed, and in general that classification will
be along the broad lines laid down by the conventional law school
curriculum.4 To do anything else would be to make the restatement
so unconventional in appearance as to prevent its usefulness as an
immediate court room aid. The danger is that law schools and writers
may in the future follow the more logical arrangement of Prof.
Richard Powell of Columbia, leaving the law of trusts to suffer the
fate of a poorly arranged index to case material.; Until that time
comes, however, it seems inevitable that the American Law Institute
follow the classifications with which most courts and lawyers are
familiar through their reading or because of the arrangement of the
courses which they have studied.
Granted that Trusts is, at least for the present, a necessary classi-
fication of decided cases, it is certain that the formulae and rules cling-
ing to this classification are badly in need of clarification. There re-
mains a choice of methods of accomplishing this. One way is present
modern ideas and current problems in the garb of ancient language-
to show, for example, that the Statute of Uses passed by Henry VII,
can by ingeniously twisting the terms still be made to pass for a rule
of thumb in certain situations today. Thus we preserve as far as
possible all of the logical machinery of the law. We include in our
scheme all the logical devices which are in current use, and revive many
of those which are obsolete. Our contribution is an orderly presenta-
tion of these devices all reconciled with one another and arranged in
a systematic way-a complete philosophical system, by which every
human behavior, influenced by, if not based on the institution of the family; (6)
that this body of law deals with an area of closely integrated techniques of the
practicing lawyer; and lastly (7) that the body of law dealing with such dis-
positions forms a convenient unit for treatment as a law school course .... This
course was designed to eliminate the courses theretofore given as 'Future Interests,'
'Wills' and the major part of 'Trusts.' Some parts of the traditional course on
Trusts deal so exclusively with aspects of the law of banking that they are thought
to be better handled in connection with a course in which related behavior of
bankers and their customers is available for comparison."
"The arrangement of the restatement follows the general outlines of AaIEs,
CASES ON TRUSTS, first published in 1882, as enlarged in Scorr, CASES ON TRuSTS(1919) and in a later edition in 1931.
'In addition to Mr. Powell's arrangement (supra note 3) Mr. Homer Carey
has recently published an excellent casebook which is in use at Michigan, in which
the conceptual approach to trusts which begins by distinguishing the device from
bailments, etc., is abandoned, and the situations in which the device appears are
examined. At Yale, also, Mr. Gulliver and Mr. Townsend have reclassified the
cases using the term. There seems to be a distinct movement away from "Trusts"
as a body of definable principles.
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possible case can be tested, those which do not contain trusts, rejected,
and those which are trusts, solved.
A second method of treating the restatement is to examine the an-
cient language of trusts in the light of its utility in solving modem
problems. Such a method frankly recognizes that no closed philo-
sophical system of the law of trusts is possible, because the cases in-
cluded under the term are too unlike. We therefore try to determine
which formulae and rules are useful in deciding cases, and which are
useless. We are dealing with an abstraction which cuts across a large
number of complicated situations, changing its content with each one
of them, and used in varying ways. It is certainly possible to describe
the different uses of the device in each of these different types of situa-
tions, instead of trying to define it so that it will have the false ap-
pearance of being used in the same way in all of them. But this
means that we must abandon definitions and deductions from definitions
for a more descriptive method of statement.
The two methods are illustrated in the difference in point of view
between the preface and the main body of the Restatement of a law of
trusts.
The introductory note to the Restatement of Trusts begins as
follows:
"A trust is one of several judicial devices whereby one person
is enabled to deal with property for the benefit of another person."' 6
The introduction goes on to explain in general terms the kind of situa-
tion in which this device is used. Here we have a brief description of
what the so-called law of trusts really is and why we have to use it.
To the writer it appears to be an admirable approach to the law of
trusts.
When we start the restatement itself we find ourselves in an entirely
different atmosphere, with a different set of values. A trust is no
longer a device, or a way of talking about things. It has become en-
dowed with an independent existence. It is (when not qualified by
the word "charitable," "resulting," or "constructive")
"a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising out of a manifesta-
tion of an intention to create it, and subjecting the person in whom the prop-
erty is vested to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit
of another person."'
'RESTATEMsENT OF THE LAW OF TRuSTS (Am. L. Inst. 1930) Introductory
Note, at 11.
'RESTATEI.ENT, § 2, p. 14, Definition of Trust.
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It is at first difficult to understand how a trust can be a device and
a relationship at the same time in the ordinary acceptance of these
terms. A moment's reflection, however, clears up the inconsistency.
It is apparent that in the introductory note a restatement of the law
from a new point of view has been commenced and then suddenly
abandoned. It is the point of view of one who wishes to describe
accurately the results of cases where the courts employ a certain de-
vice, and the reasons, historical and logical, why they choose to talk
about those results in the terms of that device. It is a way of saying
that these are the facts and what follows are the abstractions.
With the opening definition of the restatement the attitude changes.
The method is that of analysis of fundamental elements of concepts.
Definition, not description, has become its aim.
That method compels us to pretend that a trust is a certain peculiar
kind of human relationship, which can be identified and observed
whether there is any law suit pending between the parties or not. This
is done because we want to define trusts so that we can use it later to
predict what courts will do in dissimilar cases. We must then dis-
tinguish it from a debt, a guardianship, a bailment, an equitable charge,
and so on.8 We are no longer interested in why courts call these
things trusts, or why they make these distinctions. For example when
A delivers to B the possession of his horse which he directs B to keep
in his stable, we simply observe the transaction, look at A and at B
and at the horse in the stable, and say to ourselves, "It is evident that
in the absence of a contrary intention no trust has arisen here."9  We
then pass on to the next distinction.
In the second chapter our method forces us to try to define how
these things called trusts come into being. The cases are so dis-
similar that the best we can do is to say that they arise out of a mani-
'The RESTATEMENT deals at length with the following distinctions:
Section 8. A bailment is not a trust.
Section 9. An executorship or an administratorship is not a trust.
Section 10. A guardianship is not a trust.
Section 11. An agency is not a trust.
Section 12. A mortgage or a pledge or a lien is not a trust.
Section 13. An equitable charge is not a trust.
Section 14. An interest subject to a condition subsequent is not, because of the
condition, held in trust.
Section 15. A debt is not a trust.
Section 16. A contract to convey property is not a trust, whether or not the
contract is specifically enforceable.
Section 17. A contract for the benefit of a third party is not a trust.
Section 18. If a chose in action is assigned, the assignor does not become
trustee for the assignee.
'RESTATEMENT, at 24. This illustration is used to show distinction between
bailments and trusts. Similar illustrations appear under each of the distinctions
quoted in note 8, supra.
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festation of intention to create them. We find that some of them,
the passive trusts in land, are very short lived indeed, because Henry
VIII rises from his grave and executes them, unless by some happy
chance they are clothed with affirmative duties, in which case he lets
them alone.10
The third chapter" defines the Trust Property and shows what can-
not be held in trust. Here we find some interesting cases of people who
tried to create trusts and failed. It appears that A declared himself
trustee of the next picture he was going to paint for B, but no trust
materialized.' 2 He then tried to declare himself trustee for B of the
next calf his cow would have.13  Again he failed. Undiscouraged,
he declared himself trustee of the next moose he would shoot, but with-
out any better success. 14  He didn't use the right words. Had he
declared himself trustee of the canvas, and voluntarily agreed to paint
a picture on it to improve the res, he might have been a trustee.' 5 Had
he declared himself trustee of his agricultural business, goodwill and
all, he might have been trustee of the calf, everq though the business
consisted only of one cow.'0 Had the trustee been possessed of a
" RESTATEMENT, § 22: "The Statute of Uses does not execute active trusts.
"Comment:
"a. A trust is not active unless the trustee has by the terms of the trust affirma-
tive duties to perform. If his sole duties are negative, that is, not to interfere with
the beneficiary in his enjoyment of the property, the trust is passive. Prior to the
enactment of the Statute of Uses a person who held land to the use of another had,
in addition to his negative duties, the following two affirmative duties: (1) to pro-
tect the property against other persons than the beneficiary; (2) to convey the
property to the beneficiary or in accordance with his directions. If there was a
manifestation of an intention to impose additional affirmative duties, he held upon
an active trust."
11 Entitled "The Trust Property," RESTATEMENT, at 132, §§ 70-83.
12 Illustration used to show that "An interest which has not come into existence
or which has ceased to exist cannot be held in trust." RESTATEMENT, at 132, § 71.
' See note 12, supra.1 4Ibid.
Cf. RESTATEMENT, at 146, § 79: "Non-Transferable Interest Created in
Trust or Accruing to the Trustee.
"An interest which is of such a character that a person holding it for his own
benefit could not transfer it may be held in trust if
"(a) it is created in trust; or
"(b) it accrues to a trustee of a trust already created."
At page 147: "Comment: (on above section)
"b. If a trust has been created, an interest may accrue to the trustee by reason
of his title to the trust property, which interest he holds in trust, although a person
holding such interest for his own benefit could not transfer it nor make himself
trustee of it."
16 Cf. RESTATEMENT, at 148, § 80: "Interests in intangible things, if transfer-
able, can be held in trust."
"Illustration: (to above section)
"2. A carries on a retail grocery business. He transfers the business including
the good-will to B in trust for C. B holds the good-will as well as the other assets
of the business in trust for C.
"The good-will of a business or a trade-mark cannot be transferred apart from
the transfer of the business. Similarly the good-will or trade-mark cannot be trans-
ferred in trust apart from a transfer of the business, nor is a declaration of trust
of the good-will or trade-mark valid apart from a declaration of trust of the busi-
ness."
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trade secret about the ways of shooting moose, he might have been
trustee of that and B might have had his beneficial interest in the
the first moose shot.17
It is interesting to note that our method of definition, once adopted,
prevents us from giving an indication why A was attempting to use
the trust device in these cases. The supposition is that he was simply
practicing. Thus the gap between the opening description of trusts in
the introductory note and the opiening definition becomes more and
more apparent in the selection of these illustrations. If we had used the
descriptive method we would have been forced by the very turn our
language took, to explain for what purposes the device was used and
in what situations. The case of the moose would come under the
heading "The Use of the Trust Device in Moose Hunting." Described
in this way it would appear of doubtful utility to predict results of liti-
gation in this manly sport. But under the method adopted we are not in
the least interested in what a trust is for; we do not admit that it may
be just a way of talking-and therefore the fact that the illustration
is taken from moose hunting does not bother us. Indeed, unreal illus-
trations are the only way of making unreal concepts clear. Actual cases
hinder our task in two ways. They are likely to show that a trust is
often not a relationship at all, but a method of logical transportation
after we have decided where we want to go. Further they cannot be
disassociated from the remedy. This remedy, according to our concep-
tual plan, must not be even mentioned until we have clearly in mind
what a trust is, regardless of what the parties expect to gain by using
it. Therefore we confine ourselves to cases which never happen.
This restatement of trusts from the point of view of the person
who wants a system of abstractions is as well done as such a thing can
be. But the point we raise here is that the abstractions are of such a
character that they cannot be stated in terms of the actual situations
where the trust device is used.
A further difficulty with the restatement as a system of concepts is
the necessity of defining a trust in terms of itself. Concepts which
are used to classify similar situations can be defined abstractly with
much more ease than concepts which include dissimilar cases. The
concept of trusts is used both as a means of transferring the benefits of
property with a limited power of control, and also as a means of avoid-
ing the logical implications of some rule of law, such as the statute of
frauds, the statute of wills, the rule that creditors must share equally
" Cf. RESTATEmsNT, at 148: "Comment: d. A trade secret may be held in
trust.
"Illustration: (to above comment)
"3. A invents a formula for manufacturing an ointment and proceeds to manu-
facture and sell such ointment. He communicates the formula to B, who agrees to
manufacture and sell the ointment according to the formula for the benefit of C.
B is trustee of the trade secret for C."
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in an insolvent estate, the statutes of limitation, and many others.
The definition of such an abstraction,, if it is to be made without regard
to the obvious differences in these cases, must therefore be in terms of
itself. There is no escape from this dilemma.
For example let us examine the restatement definition of a trust.
It is defined as a relationship.' 8 But a relationship here can only mean
a right-duty relationship. It is said that it is a fiduciary relationship,
and then a fiduciary is defined as one owing duties.' 9 It is said that it
arises out of a manifestation of intention to create a trust. But the
manifestation may consist of undescribed conduct.20  Hence a trust is
a right-duty relationship which arises when courts say it has arisen.
The duties must be equitable, which means that they must be duties
which a court of equity will enforce. 21  Bailments, debts, agencies are
not trusts because the duties are enforced by a court of law and by defi-
nition trust duties are those enforced by a court of equity. But not all
equitable duties are trust duties. For example, a guardianship, 2 2 partial
assignment,2 3 or mortgage24 is not a trust. The reason is that not only
" RESTATEMENT, at 14, § 2: "Definition of Trust.
"A trust, as the term is used in the Restatement of this Subject, when not
qualified by the word 'charitable,' 'resulting' or 'constructive,' is a fiduciary rela-
tionship with respect to property, arising as a result of a manifestation of an in-
tention to create it and subjecting the person in whom the property is vested to
equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person."
" RESTATEMENT, at 14: "b. Fiduciary relation. A person in a fiduciary rela-
tion to another is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other as to matters
within the scope of the relation."
' RESTATEMENT, at 79, § 36:
"(1) The manifestation of intention to create a trust may be made by written
or spoken words or by other conduct.
"(2) No particular form of words or conduct is necessary for the manifesta-
tion of intention to create a trust."
At 81, § 37:
"No trust is created unless the settlor manifests an intention to create enforce-
able duties."
21 RESTATEMENT, at 17:
"Conmnuents:
"e. Equitable Duty. An equitable duty is a duty enforceable in a court of chan-
cery or in a court having the powers of a court of chancery. In many States the
same court has the powers of a court of law and a court of chancery. In some
states courts of probate have to some extent the powers of a court of chancery."
RESTATEMENT, § 10: "A guardianship is not a trust."
RESTATEMIENT, at 54, § 19: "If a partial assignment of a chose in action is
made, the assignor does not become trustee for the assignee."
"Conmnent:
"b. There is a fiduciary relation between trustee and beneficiary. In the case
of a partial assignment as in the case of a total assignment, there is not a fiduciary
relation between the assignor and the assignee."
"c. A partial assignment of a chose in action is to be distinguishdd -from a total
assignment in trust for the assignor as to a part of the chose in action."
Thus a partial assignment may. become a trust at any moment by the discovery
of a fiduciary relationship. Of course it must be the kind of a fiduciary relation-
ship which we call a trust, as is indicated by the RESTATEMENT, at 15. "The scope
of the transaction affected by the relation and the extent of the duties imposed are
not identical in all fiduciary relations. The duties of a trustee are more extensive
than the duties of some other fiduciaries. As to the duties of a trustee, see
Chapter 7."
SRESTATEMENT, at 31, § 12: "A mortgage or a pledge or a lien is not a trust.
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must the trust duties be equitable, but they must be the kind of equitable
duties which we call trust duties. Thus, when we are through with the
definitions and distinctions of the first fifty-six pages we have said in
a great many words that a trust is, after all, a trust.
Of course the distinctions between bailments, agencies, and the
like, and trusts do give us some picture of the ordinary situations in
which these terms have been used, and so we feel that we see the thing
more clearly. But the picture is necessarily confused as the illustrations
show that a trust can change into one of these things at any moment,
and change back with equal facility. For example, on page 42:
"A employs B as his housekeeper. B hands over to A $1000.00 of her
savings on A's agreement 'to keep the money for her and to pay her 6% in-
terest.' It the absence of a contrary intention A is a debtor and not a
trustee."'
The contrary intention may be implied from undescribed conduct.
In other words the above situation is a bailment where the courts call
it a bailment and a trust where they call it a trust. Our problem may be
stated as follows: (1) We must formulate a rule which will govern two
dissimilar situations which have nothing in common except that the rule
is to be applied to both of them; (2) Such a rule must be capable of tak-
ing on a different meaning in each situation without change of language;
(3) The only way to accomplish this is to provide the rule with a verbal
device by which it can automatically turn itself inside out. The phrase
"in the absence of a contrary intention" does this admirably.20 If the
rule happens to be a useful one, which need change its meaning only
occasionally, there is no objection to this. The objection lies in this
that our attitude prevents us from discriminating between useful and
useless rules because we refuse to describe their operation. The method
of definition makes all uses of the device of trust appear of equal value.
It is impossible to examine the utility of a concept and to state it as a
fundamental truth at the same time.
This is shown in the treatment of the Statute of Uses. In the second
chapter we find the statement that the Statute of Uses executes a pas-
sive trust in land by making legal the interest of the beneficiary.27 Then
"c. There is a fiduciary relation between trustee and beneficiary, but not ordi-
narily between mortgagee and mortgagor....
"There is, however, such a relation between mortgagor and mortgagee that the
mortgagor may set aside a transaction between them in which the mortgagee has
taken an unconscionable advantage of the necessitous condition of the mortgagor."
' RESTATEMENT, § 15, Illustration 7-used to show distinction between Trust
and Debt.
' This same phrase is used in nine of the illustrations showing the distinction
between a trust and a debt.
' RESTATEmqENT, at 57, § 20: "The Statute of Uses.
"(1) The Statute of Uses provides that where a person is seised of land 'to
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follow further definitions ,of what cases the statute will operate on.
Nobody knows just what the results of this sudden legality are.28  The
existence of modern recording acts are not even hinted at. It appears
that a man can have "legal title" to land and still have to go into a court
of equity to compel the execution of a deed. A descriptive method
might point out that this elaborate make-believe was used as a rule of
thumb in certain disappearing procedural problems; that it might be
used to confuse the issue as to whether a jury could be demanded, that
the construction of quaintly phrased and obscure deeds might hang on
it, that poorly drawn attachment statutes and statutes of limitation
might be construed in its uncertain light. The Statute of Uses cannot
be ignored, but its opportunities for confusing the issue might be limited
to a few isolated cases-if indeed there are cases where it is useful.
But under the method of definition we cannot do otherwise than the
reporter has done in the restatement.
There are innumerable other uses of the trust device which demand
descriptive examination. When an individual or a bank becdmes in-
solvent, the question of what claims will be given preference appears
to turn on conceptions of express and constructive trusts,29 and the cases
must be kept apart from" family settlements by the shadowy distinctions
the use, confidence or trust' of any other person, the latter person shall be seised
or possessed of the land in the same estate as he would otherwise have in use.
"(2) The effect of the Statute of Uses is to make legal those interests to which
it applies, which but for the Statute would have been equitable interests.
"(3) The Statute of Uses 'executes' a use or trust when it makes legal the
interest of the beneficiary of the use or trust."
' All that is said on this question is:
REsTATEMENT, at 58: "b. When the Statute of Uses executes a use or trust
not only is the interest of the beneficiary made legal but the interest of the person
who otherwise would hold subject to the use or trust is extinguished. The Statute
thus has a double effect in turning the equitable interest of one person into a legal
interest and extinguishing the legal interest of the other."
Such a statement made without any reference to any recording acts has no
modern significance. If a man has a record title subject to a passive trust undis-
closed on that record, his "legal title" from any practical point of view is far from
extinguished.
' Mr. Bogert in a recent article, Failed Batiks and Preferences (1931) 29
Micr. L. REv. 545, at 567, makes the following statement: "The present tendency
of decisions and statutes to place collection losses on the general creditors of failed
collecting banks and to give a preference to the forwarder on a trust theory is to
be deplored." The unfortunate results of the application of the trust theory to bank
cases in which Mr. Bogert complains, can only be realized when these cases are
considered as a problem separate from the use of the trust device to solve other
problems. The restatement in building up an abstract distinction between a trust
and a debt which is to be applied anywhere and everywhere, makes possible and
probable the loose use of the term which permits such preferences, because (1) it
permits us to forget the real issue involved in a flood of irrelevant cases, and (2)
because it allows us to use a case which goes too far in calling a trust a debt, a
general precedent for any case no matter how different the situation. Cf. the treat-
ment of this problem in the RESTATEMENT with Townsend, Construwtive Trusts and
Bank Collection (1930), 39 YALE L. J. 980, and Turner, Bank Collections-The
Direct Routing Practice (1930), 39 YALE L. J. 468.
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between constructive trusts and express trusts manifested by conduct."
Is it useful to ignore the policy of the rules requiring equal distribution
of assets by pretending that we have found a rule of thumb? And are
these rules of thumb as definite as the definition indicates ? Only a de-
scription of the cases will disclose the answers.
Since the definition of the term "trust" cuts across so many differ-
ent problems, the task of the person annotating the restatement is full
of pitfalls. Cases using the term must be put somewhere in the foot-
notes and they must appear to support or contradict the general propo-
sitions of the text. To illustrate, let us take two typical cases and find
out what they might be cited to prove. In a Pennsylvania caseal thirteen
bonds were found in the safety deposit box of the deceased, enclosed in
an envelope on the outside of which was written "thirteen bonds, $1,000
each, held for Tom Smith Kelly." This, aided by other evidence show-
ing that the deceased intended to give the bonds to Kelly, was held to
be a trust. Actually the case had nothing whatever to do with trusts,
but conterned only the question as to whether the Statute of Wills or
the rule of delivery of gifts might be evaded under such circumstances.
The trust device, however, enabled the court to decide the case without
mentioning the Statute of Wills.
A New York case, 32 deciding almost exactly the same question, can
be cited to support an entirely different set of abstractions in the re-
statement. There bonds were found in the deceased's deposit box, in
an envelope, with the inscription "whatever is in this envelope belongs
to Miss Anna C. Miller." The trial court gave the bonds to Miss Miller.
The Appellate Division took them away from her, because neither a
trust nor a completed gift was shown.33 The Court of Appeals finally
decided that Miss Miller could have the bonds, because the writing was
a declaration against interest which proved that the gift must have been
completed during the lifetime of the deceased. This case thus reaches
the same result as the Pennsylvania case, though the reasoning of the
intermediate appellate court holding that there is no "trust" under such
circumstances is not disapproved by the Court of Appeals.
Under the restatement both of these cases would be cited to show
that "the owner of property can create a trust of the property by de-
claring himself trustee of it, although he receives no consideration for
It is obviously impossible to tell whether many of these bank collection cases
using the trust theory as a basis for a preference are constructive or express trusts,
or constructive trusts arising out of the breach of express trusts, nor is it in any
way material to make the distinction here.
"' Estate of Thomas Smith, 144 Pa. 428, 22 Atl. 916 (1891).
12 Miller v. Silverman, 247 N. Y. 447, 160 N. E. 910 (1928).
"Miller v. Silverman, 221 App. Div. 697, 224 N. Y. Supp. 609 (2d Dept. 1927).
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the declaration of trust. '34 Also to show that "A trust can be created
without notice to or acceptance by the beneficiary. '35  At this point,
however, these two similar cases begin to quarrel. The Pennsylvania
case may be used to prove the statement that "the manifestation of in-
tention to create a trust may be by written or spoken words or other
conduct."'3 G The New York case will illustrate that "no trust is created
unless the settlor manifests an intention to create enforceable duties."3 7-
It also proves that "a disposition to take effect on the death of the per-
son making the disposition and as to which he has substantially the
entire control until his death" 38 is a testamentary disposition and there-
fore "a trust cannot be created by a testamentary disposition unless the
requirements of the statutes concerning wills are complied with."3 9  It
then disappears from the restatement of trusts, to reappear again in the
restatement of evidence, which explains the result. The Pennsylvania
case would have to be cited under these last two principles for the pur-
posd of distinguishing it from an attempted testamentary disposition.
We would have to say that since the court found a trust here, it must
have been that the trustee lost control of the envelope containing the
securities before he died. But a still better way is to avoid the trouble-
some problem by means of the comment which says "a statement of the
general rules determining what is a testamentary disposition of property
is not within the scope of this subject."4 0
Suppose that the annotator is doubtful whether these cases involve
any principles of trusts at all. Do these inscriptions on the envelope con-
stitute the "manifestation of intention" required by the definition of a
trust in Section 2? He turns for enlightenment to the comment below
Section 2 and finds:
"g. The phrase 'manifestation of intention,' means the external expression of
intention as distinguished from undisclosed intention. As to manifestation of
intention to create a trust see Sections 33-38."
Hopefully he turns to Sections 33-38. Section 33 reads as follows:
"A trust is created only if the settlor manifests an intention to create a trust."
This is somewhat cryptic, so he reads the comment which says:
RESTATEMENT, at 86, § 39.
RESTATEMENT, at 101, § 47.
RESTATEMENT, at 79, § 36; at 73, § 33: Comment: "It is immaterial whether
the settlor knows that the intended relationship is called a trust." Also p. 20, § 2,
comment g.
ESTATEMENT, at 81, § 37.
RESTATEMENT, at 119, § 61, comment a.
RESTATEMENT, at 119, § 62.
"Supra note 38.
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"a. In order to create a trust the settlor must manifest an intention to create
such a relationship as constitutes a trust as defined in Section 2. It is immaterial
whether the settlor knows that the intended relationship is called a trust."
Similar notions are found in the other Sections between 33 and 38.
At this point there is nothing further to do except to get off the
merry-go-round. 41 The fault is not with the Reporter, but with the
attempt to restate trusts by deductions from definitions. If we could
only use these cases to illustrate the use of the trust device as an arti-
ficial means of avoiding the implication of the Statute of Wills because
directions in a safety deposit box accessible only to the deceased offered
a substantial guarantee against perjury, there would be no difficulty.
If there were thus classified, we would not care whether they were real
"trusts" or not.
Instances of this kind may be multiplied indefinitely.
A recent case in West Virginia42 decided that the draft of an in-
solvent bank drawn on another bank was a preferred claim, because an
express trust was found to exist. In annotating the restatement this
case would have to be cited to show that West Virginia did not strictly
adhere to the doctrine that there must be a definite res. If it were
pointed out that the case was one where the trust was used only as a
device, and that the court, for some reason not disclosed in the opinion,
wanted to give holders of drafts preferred claims, the case could be re-
examined on its merits, and the court might have to tell why it decided
the case the way it did. Consider it as a case defining a trust as an ab-
straction, and there is no limit to the cases where it can be used as a
confusing analogy.
The objections here raised are not criticisms of the skill of the Re-
porter. At the risk of being repetitious we wish to emphasize that it is
impossible to remove them, because they are inherent in the nature of
the subject, when approached from the angle of attempted definition.
' Illustrations of the inevitable circles into which any systems of definitions of
the elements of trusts drive us are numerous. For example, the concept of "capac-
ity of the trustee."
"Section 85. A natural person has capacity to take property in trust to the ex-
tent he has capacity to take property for his own benefit."
"Comment: As to the meaning of capacity, see Section 28."
Turning to Section 28, we discover that:
"Section 28. A person has capacity to create a trust by declaring himself
trustee of property to the extent he has capacity to transfer the property inter
vivos."
"Comment c. As to capacity to be trustee, see Section 85."
Smaller circles are found in expressions like the following:
"Section 41. A prominse to create a trust in the future is enforceable if, but
only if, the requirements for an enforceable contract are complied with."
"Section 67. A trust cannot be created unless there is trust property of such a
nature as to be the proper subject of a trust and a proper beneficiary."
' Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullins, 108 W. Va. 12, 150 S. E. 137 (1929);
see Note (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 297.
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The reason is that none of the classifications follow the lines of any
particular set of comparable situations, to which a general policy is ap-
plicable.
Such classifications do not make the task of the lawyer easier by
confining his citations to relevant cases. Instead they compel volumi-
nous briefs and treatises, reconciling the different problems forced under
the same abstraction. Yet it was to avoid the necessity of such refine-
ment that the restatement was originally projected.
To avoid the confusion caused by the fact that all sorts of problems
are included under the term "trust," we need only recognize the implica-
tions of the admission made in the introduction that "a trust is one of
several juridical devices," and that it has been used in inconsistent ways.
It is not the name of an organized philosophy; it is simply a bad piece
of indexing. But paradoxically enough, the fact that so many people
consider it as an organized philosophy and have written so many books
from that point of view is the very reason why this conventional de-
partment of the law so badly needs the expert attention of the American
Law Institute. The reclassification of the cases using this term, already
under way, is hindered on every turn by the existence of this ancient
and too inclusive concept. If the restatement is to clear away the de-
bris and make a new arrangement possible, it must abandon definitions
in favor of a simple descriptive process of the purposes for which this
logical machine is used in different kinds of cases.
The phrase "descriptive method" of restatement has been con-
stantly used in this article. Difficult as it is to outline a restatement of
trusts in a few pages, some attempt must be made here to show how a
restatement from that point of view would differ in form from the
present set of definitions and how it would enable us to use as illustra-
tions real problems, instead of unreal hypothetical cases.
The purpose of such a method would be an exposition of the dif-
ferent uses to which the trust device has been put, and a discussion of
the utility of the device in solving the particular problem. In that ex-
position we must bear in mind two axioms: (1) That no trust was ever
intentionally created by an individual or discovered by a court except for
some purposes other than the desire to create a trust; (2) that the pur-
pose of the use of the trust device by the individual at the time of the
transaction, or by the court at the time of the suit, is our key to the clas-
sification of trust cases. A classification of purposes is not easy, but it
seems that they may conveniently be divided into two kinds: (1) Where
the trust device is intentionally used to convey property; (2) where it
is used by way of analogy to enable the court to give a remedy which
the logical implications of some rule of law might deny.
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With this in mind we might start our restatement with a condensed
history of the device, as is attempted in the introduction to the present
draft. Here is an opportunity to examine critically much obsolete ma-
chinery. We can substitute for extended sections of the present draft,
statements like the following:
Topic-The Effect of the Statute of Uses
THE STATUTE OF USES OF HENRY VIII IS THE ORIGIN OF CERTAIN ARTIFICIAL
CONCEPTS WHICH HAVE No UTILITY IN SOLVING MODERN PROBLEMS AND
WHICH MAY THEREFORE BE DISCARDED AS A METHOD OF JUDICIAL EXPREs-
SION.
Comment a. It often happens either by virtue of the terms of a conveyance or
by subsequent events that the beneficiary of a trust becomes entitled to the
entire control over the property and the rights and duties of the trustee are
merely nominal. In such cases it is unnecessary in order to give the property
to the beneficiary to say that the Statute of Uses has executed a passive trust.
Since the beneficiary may obtain the property whether the statute of uses is in
force or not, in any jurisdiction, the use of the artificial machinery of the stat-
ute simply compels a court to cite or distinguish irrelevant cases.'
Comment b. The conception of the execution of a passive trust by the statute
of uses has been used in order to make the archaic language sometimes used in
deeds and conveyancing statutes operate to convey title in the modern sense.
A sensible recognition of the intention of the parties is all that is necessary to
do this, and these conceptions are interesting only as an historical explanation
of how that language came to be there."
Comment c. The conceptual machinery of the statute is also found in cases in-
volving:
" BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 556: "Not only must the trust terminate because of
the expiration of the period stated by the settlor to be the trust period, but also
because the continuance of the trust would be useless. If the result sought to be
reached by the establishment of the trust has been achieved, equity will either re-
gard the trust as ended or will end it. Many courts have held that, on the accom-
plishment of the trust purpose, the legal title of the trustee ceases ipso facto, and
the person entitled to the property after the end of the trust becomes automatically
the holder of the legal title. Other courts have reached the same result on a differ-
ent theory by holding that the accomplishment of the trust purpose caused the
original trust to end, and left the trustee the holder of the legal title under a pas-
sive trust for the person next entitled. This latter view would seem more logical
and less apt to produce confutsion in titles than a change of title without action or
record."
See cases in footnotes to the above paragraph in Bogert for illustrations of
how complicated the simple process of determining the cestui's rights may become
by using the doctrine of Uses as a reason for the result.
" Many courts and writers indulge in the curious idea that a deed using the an-
cient language of bargain and sale would not convey legal title if courts forgot to
use the concepts of the Statute of Uses. If this needs refutation, the fact that a
large number of states seem to get along without the doctrine should be sufficient.
PERRY, TREATISE ON THE LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (6th ed. 1911) §279.
Note (1908) 16 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1148.
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(1) Deeds which take effect in the future.!'
(2) The construction of peculiar wills and deeds.
(3) The construction of statutes providing for judgment liens or attachment
statutes.!
(4) The determination of procedural questions such as the conflicting juris-
diction between courts of law and equity where this question is still important,
or of questions as to whether the trustee should be joined in the suit."
(5) The construction of Statutes of limitations."
In none of these cases does the machinery of the Statute offer either a real
guide or a rational modern explanation.
It may be that these destructive generalizations may be thought to
be too broad.50 If so, a more conservative statement might be substi-
tuted to the effect that these conceptions furnish a convenient rule of
thumb in a few eases. The restatement would then have the effect of
isolating such cases and rendering them innocuous as general precedents.
"See Note (1921) 11 A. L. R. 23. In this exhaustive note it is significant to
observe (1) that the machinery of the Statute of Uses appears in a comparatively
few cases, most of them old; (2) that this machinery does not appear to cause
different results from those in cases not using it; (3) that it makes the opinions
more difficult to read and less intelligible.
"Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Me. 470, 124 Atl. 198 (1924), annotated in COSTIGAN,
CASES ON TRUSTS (1925) 28-32.
Moll v. Gardner, 214 Ill. 248, 73 N. E. 442 (1905) (doctrine of uses used to
determine when judgments against beneficiaries become liens under Illinois Stat-
ute) ; Hutchins v. Heywood, 50 N. H. 491 (1871). Here the question arose as to
the right of a creditor to satisfaction of his debt from an estate fraudulently con-
veyed by the debtor. The court reached its decision by first creating a resulting
trust and then condemning it to immediate execution by the Statute of Uses. It is
difficult to conceive of a more complicated way of obtaining an obvious result, or
a method of expression further removed from the problem involved. The case
later becomes an important authority on the question as to whether the Statute
of Uses really "executes" a "resulting trust" in America, on which conception Mr.
Costigan says there is a "conflict of authority," with the above case in the minor-
ity. COSTIGAN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 32, n. 33. It is in such ways that the use
of these concepts complicates the law by enabling us to cite cases without regard
to the problem involved.
,* Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410 (1908). It is difficult to be-
lieve that the American Law Institute desires that questions of modern procedure
and joinder of parties be determined on the basis of such concepts, or that it feels
that there is no simpler way of doing it permitted by the rule of stare decisis. Yet
that is one of the effects of a positive restatement of the Statute of Uses.
" Schenk v. Wicks, 23 Utah 576, 65 Pac. 732 (1901).
' This statement is made in deference to many respectable authorities on trusts
and real property whom the writer has consulted. Some of them feel that disastrous
consequences might follow the abandonment of the conceptual machinery of the
ancient "Use." Just what these unfortunate consequences might be the writer has
no idea. Nevertheless, if narrow limits do exist for the beneficial application of
the device, they should be pointed out specifically. Otherwise there is no limit to
the use by ingenious counsel or writers. For example Perry says: "The applica-
tion of the statute has been very much modified in many of the States but the
general idea is still acted on. Mr. Washburn remarks that it is not a fair inference
that the doctrine of uses would be inapplicable in any state where they are de-
clared not to exist, either because no case has arisen in the courts of the state to
test the question, or because a form of deed not known under the statute of uses
may have been declared by the statute of a state sufficient to convey lands." 1
PERRY, op. cit. srpra note 44, at 511, 512.
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As the restatement now stands, the Statute of Uses seems to operate au-
tomatically to execute all passive trusts. The recording statutes exist-
ing in all states are ignored, and the conceptions of the execution of
equitable title are set out in black letter type as mandatory directions
for courts to follow. There is no explanation of the kinds of cases in
which they are useful, or the purposes for which they may be used.
Topic-Distinctions between Express, Resulting and Constructive
Trusts
No USEFUL CLAsSIFIcATION OF CASES UNDER THE DIVISIONS OF TRUSTS, CON-
srucrIrvE TRUSTS, RESULTING TRUSTS CAN BE MADE By DEFINING THESE
ABsTRAcTIONS AND ANALYZING THEIR FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS IN THE
ABSTRACT.
Comment: The reason for this is that no trust can be discussed in the abstract
without considering its purpose. An attempt to do so leads us into elaborate dis-
tinctions between trusts and bailments, debts, equitable charges, business trusts,
mortgages, contracts to convey, assignments, etc., which in turn must be dis-
cussed without regard to how the question arises. The result is that the de-
cision whether a trust or something else has been created depends on the found
intention of the parties, which is determined by the court's appraisal of their
conduct; hence, the court can, by assigning such weight as it wishes to this
criterion, erect any of these various kinds of trusts.
If the American Law Institute is really serious in its desire to re-
lieve courts and attorneys from what Mr. Root calls "the vast multitude
of decisions which our practitioners are obliged to consult," statements
of this kind will accomplish more than hundreds of pages attempting to
determine the exact difference between an active and passive trust in the
abstract, or the fundamental distinctions between a debt, a trust, and a
resulting trust, without regard to their purpose.
The topics set out above might form part of the initial discussion
of the history of the trust device, sufficiently detailed to show that the
conventional definitions of a trust are not convenient guides to groups
of cases involving a single principle or policy. This task accomplished,
the restatement should proceed to a classification of the cases using the
term in the light of the purpose for which it was invoked. The follow-
ing general classifications are ventured.
I. The use of the trust device in cases where the owner of property
desires to give one person the benefit and another the control of that
property.5'
These are, for the most part. intentional uses of the trust device.
They include the family settlement cases and the rapidly growing busi-
" Professor Richard Powell of Columbia, in his course in Trusts and Estates,
classifies these cases with cases in Future Interests and Wills. He divides his
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ness done by great trust companies. They are entirely different in pur-
pose from cases where the device is used by the court after the transac-
tion is completed, to avoid some rule of law or give some special remedy.
Under this group we could consider:
1. Limitations on the character of the property to which the de-
vice inay be applied.
We would not try to do this by defining property, but by showing
that courts had commenced by applying this broad concept to things
like horses and land, and ended by including things like information and
trade secrets. We could not say, as the restatement does, that "an in-
teresf which has not come into existence or which has ceased to exist
cannot be held in trust" or that "an expectation or hope of receiving
property in the future cannot be held in trust."52 We would explain that
such definitions were historical rationlizations of the fact that things not
ordinarily bought and sold are not permitted to be complicated in this
way, at least until some necessity arises. When courts want to permit
the transfer of such things, they are lumped under the concept of "good
will,"'5 3 and immediately we find that expectations can be held in trust.
For example the difference between the expectation of selling goods to
future customers and getting a legacy from a future dead man, only the
first of which is supposed to be capable of being held in trust, is simply
confused by saying that one is property in existence and the other is
property which has not come into existence.
Our conclusions would be that there are very few limitations on the
kind of property which can be intentionally disposed of by the trust de-
vice, and that there is some recognized rule of policy other than defini-
tion of property which makes most of these limitations understandable.
Other possible steps in the discussion of intentional trusts might be:
2. Limitations on the intentional use of the trust device imposed
by
(a) the statute of frauds
(b) the statute of wills.
materials generally into: I. Historical Introduction; II. Problems in Wealth Dis-
position; III. Social Limitations on Wealth Disposition; IV. Problems in Admin-
istration of Trusts and Other Interests Validly Created. Thus the trust cases are
considered in their proper setting.
The RESTATEMENT, since it confines itself to the trust device, cannot make a
reorganization such as Professor Powell's. It can, howev&, by describing the
trust device, instead of defining it, pave the way for some such reclassification of
the cases in the future. Such a classification is made difficult if we are to accept
a set of principles governing trusts in all situations.
RESTATEMENT, at 138, § 74.
RESTATEMENT, at 148, § 80, illustration 2.
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Here we could discuss the formalities required of persons who in-
tentionally resorted to the trust device, without confusing them with
the cases where courts imposed a trust ex post facto to escape from the
logical consequences of the application of these statutes. "
3. Limitations on the purposes for which the separation of the con-
trol and the benefit of the property can be made.
We will not go further with these subdivisions, because it is not
possible here to attempt any complete classification of the intentional
use of the trust device. The classification made by Mr. Powell in his
materials on Future Interests and Non-Commercial Trusts offers a suffi-
ciently interesting comparison with the treatment of the restatement. It
is sufficient to show the freedom which the descriptive method gives for
the treatment of actual cases. The method of definition does not permit
us to note differences between the operation of these rules in the differ-
ent combinations of circumstances in which they may arise.
It is probable that the conventional rules fit fairly closely the cases
involving intentional trusts, but the definitions found in the restatement
do not help us t6 discover the actual effect of these rules.
The examination of the second group of cases, i.e., those which
use the trust machinery to enable the court to give an appropriate
remedy or escape an inconvenient rule, would probably disclose many
useless abstractions and might be mainly destructive in its effect. Such
cases might be described as follows:
II. The use of the trust device by the courts to escape the logical
implication of some rule of law or statute without disturbing its verbal
content.
In this general group of cases we would include the court's use of
"trusts" where the parties had not originally planned to employ the
machinery when they entered into the transaction. For example, the
intentional use of living trusts to avoid inheritance taxes would not
be considered here, because it is one of the problems confronting a man
in-disposing of his property, on which his attorney advises him. Where,
however, the court called a joint savings bank deposit a trust in order
to carry out the intention of the deceased, we have the kind of a case
we are here considering. In the first case the trust is a form of con-
veyance designed to obtain certain results; in the second it is a form of
pleading, like the-old common law writs. If the "writ" of trust lies,
"' The present restatement assumes that these statutes are applied in the same
way to an intentional trust and to one where the court erects the trust for some pur-
pose on the conduct of parties who had no definite idea of using the device when
the transactions occurred.
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then the plaintiff recovers. If it fails, the plaintiff loses. Therefore we
may expect to find developments of that form of pleading to cover new
cases as they arise. This seems to disturb many legal writers who feel
that odd cases using the device "confuse" the entire law of trusts, just
as the common law pleading enthusiasts felt that even beneficial exten-
sions in the old writs were confusing. Since they insist on classifying
these cases with cases of intentional trusts, they feel that they must
reconcile them. 5 If we simply set the cases apart, they no longer seem
"logically wrong." They become interesting examples of the develop-
ment of allegations in pleading, and are to be criticized only in the light
of their results.
Here we might separately examine numerous groups of cases like
the following:
(1) The trust device used to make gifts effective which would
otherwise fail because of the rule requiring delivery, or because of the
Statute of Wills.rG
(2) The trust device as a method of avoiding inequitable results
indicated by a strict application of the Statute of Frauds.57
The joint deposit cases offer a typical instance of these difficulties of rec-
onciliation. If the depositor is dead, it is easy to establish a trust; if he is alive
and attempting to revoke, it is almost impossible; if the beneficiary predeceased the
depositor, that factor unquestionably will influence the court. Various kinds of
presumptions are used, and a doctrine of "tentative trusts" is evolved. See Note
(1928) 37 YALE L. J. 1133; Note, L. R. A. 1917 C, 567; Note (1927) 48 A. L. R.
202. In such cases the chief difficulty in finding out what the court is doing comes
from our attempts to make them fit in with the general principles of trusts. Results
of such cases will always be difficult to predict, but the concern of the American
Law Institute is to make that lack of predictability less complicated by consider-
ing these cases apart.
'This group is not intended to include cases where an intended trust failed
because of the Statute of Wills or the rule requiring delivery of gifts. Instead it
will cover instances where the attorneys used the trust analogy as a form of plead-
ing or argument to prevent the Statute from reaching an inequitable result in a
transaction not originally intended to be a trust. Space forbids describing these
numerous cases in detail. Examples are found in notes 31 and 32, supra. The
famous case of Ex parte Pye, 18 Ves. 140 (1811), where the trust device was
used to secure an annuity to the deceased's relative, is the best known illustration.
Every contract of sale can be called a trust in which the vendor has the legal
and the vendee the equitable title, if the court is willing to stretch elastic words
like fiduciary relationship, intent to create a trust implied from conduct even
though the parties did not know what the term trust implied, etc. In cases
involving hardship because of the statute of frauds, attorneys will shape their
pleadings according to these formulae and very often succeed. The results of
many of such cases are beyond criticism, excepting for the difficulties they may
cause if we try to draw "principles" from them which may be used in other situa-
tions. Space permits only one example of this type of case. In Tanner v. Mc-
Creary, 88 W. Va. 658, 107 S. E. 405 (1921) the plaintiff purchased a lot from a
partnership, paying in full, but receiving no memorandum. The title to the lot
was in one of the partners, but plaintiff's dealings were with the other. In West
Virginia, the payment of the purchase price without more does not take the case
out of the statute of frauds. The lots had gone up in value, so that the return of
plaintiff's money was not adequate relief. The court therefore called it a trust,
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(3) The trust device as a method of giving a preferred claim in
insolvency situations.58
(4) The trust device used in assignments for the benefit of credi-
tors.
(5) The trust device as an artificial method of determining ques-
tions of procedure.
(6) The trust device used as an analogy to escape the Statute of
Limitations.
(7) The trust device as a method of permitting third party bene-
ficiaries to recover on contracts.
There are many others.5 9
Such a descriptive process would have the following advantages:
(a) It could explain the historical origin and the use of the device
in a given situation.
(b) It could indicate whether the rules of trusts compelled the
decision, or whether they were simply a stereotype method of judicial
explanation.
(c) It would make the use of the device unnecessary in the cases
where it appeared more enlightening to talk about the real reasons for
the result.
An inthresting example of how this can be done is found in Pro-
fessor Corbin's recent article in the Law Quarterly Review.00  By a
and gave the lot to the plaintiff. The result is obviously fair, and the case cau
be criticised only by those who fear its effect as a precedent on other "trust" cases.
Considered as an instance of equitable relief against the hardship of the statute of
frauds, the case presents no difficulties, nor has it bothered the West Virginia
Court since it was decided.
1 The use of the trust device in insolvency situations to secure preferred claims
is capable of much subdivision. However, these subdivisions cannot be based on
the distinctions between express and constructive trusts, because it makes no differ-
ence so far as obtaining the preferred claim whether the money was given as an
express trust implied from conduct on which a constructive trust of the proceeds
has arisen, or whether it was a constructive trust. The present restatement would
appear to treat some of these cases under "trusts" and others, obtaining the same
result, under "constructive trusts." Suppose that a bank receives money from the
sale of an American Express traveler's draft. Do the principles of express or
constructive trusts give the American Express Co. a preferred claim?
It is obviously impossible in this article to give a complete classification of
the purposes for which the trust device is used in cases where no trust was origi-
nally intended. It will, of course, be argued that the kind of classifications indicated
is no more mutually exclusive than the concepts of express, resulting, and con-
structive trusts, and that they overlap in the same way. This is true. However,
we are not bothered by this fact, because we are not pretending to set out defini-
tions, but only to classify actual cases as best we can, so that irrelevant decisions
cannot be cited because they come under the same term. Our idea is to simplify the
task of the court by referring it to a group of situations which are as similar as
the necessity of creating some kind of grouping will permit.
c' Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties (1930) 46 L. Q. REv. 12.
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simple process of description of what the English courts are doing
with the trust device in third party beneficiary cases in order to escape
a supposed rule of law, Professor Corbin has made it unnecessary to
talk about trusts at all in such cases. His pertinent concluding sentence
is as follows:
"It is merely a question as to when independent judicial minds will recognize
the fact that fiction has been employed, that a change has been worked in the
law by its use, and that the time has come to state the result in terms which
will no longer mislead able judges and mystify the lawyers who must advise
their clients and predict judicial action.""
Certainly it would not be contended that Professor Corbin has dis-
covered the only case where the trust device was a mere fiction. But
we can never discover these cases by defining trusts. A restatement by
definition is in effect saying to the courts: "You have started out to
talk in these terms. You must continue to do so until the legislature
permits you to talk differently, no matter how unintelligible your lan-
guage is."
Of course a descriptive restatement of the law will not have the
appearance of a set of rules, because the inevitable uncertainties in the
law will appear without concealment. Since this is a departure from the
form of other restatements, the conventional objections are many and
must be taken seriously. The first one may be stated thus:
There appears to be a deep seated prejudice throughout the re-
statement against stating that any judicially recognized rule or concept
has been shown to be useless. It is sometimes done by implication, but
never directly. To say that a rule of law is simply a way of talking
which conceals the real issue of the case seems to be reserved for law
review articles and excluded from the restatement. Such a statement
in black letter type would be a real innovation. It appears to be con-
demned as "destructive criticism" of the "law" instead of "restatement."
The result of this attitude is that if all sorts of things have been called
"trusts," we are under a positive duty to define trusts so that our defi-
nition includes all of them. Hence the broad and inclusive definition
with which the restatement begins, and the conventional lines which it
follows.
To the writer it seems that this attitude overlooks the most impor-
tant contribution which the restatement can make. A large body of men
cannot write as good a book as one man, but they can give more au-
thority and prestige to what they say. Authority and prestige are the
only forces which can destroy a useless verbalism. Judges never feel
"Ibid., at 45.
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secure in abandoning an ancient way of talking, because they fear de-
structive effects on some other part of the law's "seamless web" if they
do so. A long list of archaic concepts such as the law of criminal at-
tempts, the fiction of the lost grant, the distinction between trespass and
case, local and transitory actions, the Statute of Uses, the distinction
between resulting and constructive trusts and many others, surviving in
spite of their present ineptitude, bear witness to this fact. The occa-
sional opinion which attempts to say that there is no utility in some
so-called "well settled principle" is looked upon as an example of daring
originality. It is usually followed by a concurring opinion which agrees
with the result, but sternly points out the duty of the court to use the
same language as its predecessors, no matter how far from reality that
language may be.
This task of destruction in order that more rational classification
may arise is therefore peculiarly the function of the American Law In-
stitute, charged as it is with making the task of the courts easier by
eliminating confusing refinements. The prestige of the Institute is such
that they may do this by a simple process of description. Anyone else
who attempts it runs the risk of being buried under a landslide of judi-
cial dicta upholding the ancient formulae.
A second objection is that the restatements of other subjects all
read like codes, and are definitely committed to the policy of definition,
rather than description. Therefore the law of trusts must be uniform
with what has already appeared. As a practical matter it is now too
late to suggest that the restatement of conflicts, for example, be re-
quired to show that domicile means actually different things when it is
invoked to collect taxes, when it is used in a prosecution for bigamy
based on a void divorce, and when the question of the most convenient
place for the trial of an action is in issue. The Institute appears to be
committed to the notion that there should be one "principle" governing
all these cases, which means that they think it is better to talk about
"domicile" in each of them, rather than about the actual problem in-
volved. Differences in the use of the term can always be ignored by
calling them questions of the determination of the "fact" of domicile,
which has nothing to do with the "law." But if it be too late to discuss
the soundness of this position (of which the treatment of the concept
"domicile" is only an illustration), nevertheless even those who think
that a method of definition is useful in the so-called "legal subjects"
might be the first to admit that the historic classification of "equity" de-
serves a different treatment.
The origin of equity and its persistence today are not due to the
hatred of Roman law, or the conservatism of English judges, but rather
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to the fact'that any system which is compelled to reconcile its decisions
with its formulated rules must have an escape from those rules. Equity
furnished that escape originally. If we are to continue with abstrac-
tions, equity must continue to furnish that escape today, even though the
two courts are consolidated. Even though we are committed to a treat-
ment of legal subjects by definition because of our legal tradition, there
is nothing in the history of equity or in its avowed purpose which com-
pels us so to treat equitable subjects. A conceptual approach is a be-
trayal of its origin and purpose. If the tradition of common law re-
quires abstractions, that same tradition requires that equity be free from
them in order to make legal abstractions more elastic. Where equity
fails to do this, then the law of evidence with its presumptions and
burdens of proof will be called in to create an anomalous equity on
equity, as happened in the New York case62 where a writing found in
a deposit box proved a delivery of bonds which was never made. The
descriptive process would eliminate many of the so-called rules of trusts,
but what remained would be more understandable. Much apparent pre-
dictability would be lost, but equity has always been most effective when
it has been most free from rules.
Professor Scott is to be congratulated on his concise and logical
treatment of the concepts of the law of trusts. His unquestioned skill
shown in the attempt to restate trusts as a philosophy is the best proof
that it cannot be done. The criticisms here offered question only the
utility of the approach. And he is particularly to be congratulated for
having the frankness to point out in the introductory note the method
of approach here advocated, which he appears to understand as fully as
anyone, but which considerations of policy and uniformity have appar-
ently prevented him from following.
THURMAN ARNOLD
YALE LAW SCHOOL
' Supra note 32.
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